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Undertaking empirical research in law can be a daunting task, one
for which current undergraduate and postgraduate legal
education does not provide a great deal of preparation. Yet the
ability to undertake such research is valuable and, some suggest,
in demand. Many areas of law, its operation and effects, can be
usefully informed by empirical research. This article suggests that
the benefits of empiricism are both pragmatic or policy-driven,
and theoretical.
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1. Introduction
Increasingly, higher degree research (HDR) students are encouraged to undertake empirical research in pursuit of a doctorate or research master’s degree in law. However, they
may frequently have little or no training or experience in undertaking social research,
and generally, there is a lack of education and training in empirical research methods
for undergraduate and postgraduate students in law. This leads to a corresponding dearth
of academics qualified to undertake or supervise such projects. Yet empirical methodologies also hold many attractions for legal scholars and for the practice of law – whether
in relation to understanding evidence, basing policy decisions on sound research, or having a deep and critical understanding of law’s impact on the world. With the current trend
toward interdisciplinarity, it is more important than ever that undergraduate and particularly HDR students be provided with opportunities to train in, and undertake, empirical
legal research.
Empirical research in law has a long history. The Legal Realists were thinking about
law’s social implications in the early 1900s.1 Today, it is possible to find a multitude of
examples of empirical methods in law. While criminal law and family law are perhaps
the most abundant sources,2 in Australia empirical legal research has been conducted
in areas as diverse as bankruptcy,3 consumer law,4 and law and popular culture.5 While
it may not always be explicitly labelled or taught, Mohr and Manderson observed in
CONTACT Felicity Bell
fbell@uow.edu.au
1
Pound (1910). Note that Posner (1987) identifies John Austin as the forerunner of the Legal Realists.
2
Bradney (2010), p 1025; Fehlberg (1997); Lovric and Millbank (2004).
3
Ali, O’Brien and Ramsay (2015).
4
Snijders and Webb (2014).
5
Leiboff (2013); Sharp (2012).
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2002 that more critical, interdisciplinary and empirical research was taking place in Australian universities than perhaps was commonly realised.6 They noted that ‘research
understood as a genuine and far reaching inquiry into the nature and experience of law
is taking place in our universities, and it is increasing’.7 Bradney made a similar point
in the late 1990s when he suggested that the ‘doctrinal project’ was in its ‘death throes’.8
Still, even in the face of the ‘extraordinarily confined approach’9 of doctrinal method,
there seems a general reluctance on the part of legal academics to engage with diverse
methodologies. Empirical research is ‘largely absent from law school curricula’.10 Thus,
students’ and even early career academics’ encounters with various methodologies are
likely to be ad hoc, unstructured or involve learning on the job. Even with access to training and supervisors experienced in conducting empirical research, embarking on such a
project can be a daunting task as empirical legal research throws up various unique
hurdles.11
This article considers why it is that use of empirical method remains relatively absent
from law schools. It goes on to suggest that empiricism in law holds out many possibilities,
both practically and policy-oriented, and theoretical, for legal academics and HDR students in law.

2. What is empirical research in law?
Empiricism refers to a basis in experience or experiment; ‘[t]he word “empirical” denotes
evidence about the world based on observation or experience’.12 Harrington and Merry
explain: ‘Empirical legal scholars approach what is taken to be “the law” … as a social construction to be explained by empirically testing causal and non-causal hypotheses’.13 Yet
what is meant by empirical legal research is not always clearly described or understood, or
agreed upon. Many different strands of empiricism in law can be discerned; Cane and
Kritzer refer to a ‘healthy pluralism’ of approaches.14 In a legal research context empiricism is frequently contrasted with ‘doctrinal’ work – research based on analysis of legal
texts and doctrine.15
As Economides has observed, though legal scholars themselves may not explicitly label
their work as empirical or ‘socio-legal’, it is unlikely to be only ‘esoteric theory or pure doctrinal analysis’.16 Fifteen years ago Manderson reported that only 20 per cent of Australian
HDR students in law self-reported undertaking ‘doctrinal’ research, while 17 per cent
described their work as ‘theoretical’.17 Another 20 per cent were engaged in ‘law reform’
studies,18 which may be assumed to have at least some empirical component. Hutchinson
6

Manderson and Mohr (2002).
Manderson and Mohr (2002), p 164 (emphasis added). See also Cane and Kritzer (2010), p 2.
Bradney (1998), p 71. On the parasitism of law, see further Murphy and Roberts (1987), p 680.
9
Manderson and Mohr (2002), p 163.
10
Bradney (2010), p 1028. See also Burns and Hutchinson (2009).
11
See, eg, Burns and Hutchinson (2009), pp 167–168.
12
Epstein and King (2002).
13
Harrington and Merry (2010), p 1045.
14
Cane and Kritzer (2010), p 1.
15
See generally Vick’s discussion of doctrinalism: Vick (2004), pp 177–180.
16
Economides (2014).
17
Manderson (2002), p 152; reporting on the General Information Survey for the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.
Note that Hutchinson and Duncan (2012) comment that ‘doctrinal’ was not defined in this study: p 99.
18
Manderson (2002).
7
8
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and Duncan report that a small study of law theses in the period 2004–09 found that just
over half were ‘unlikely to require ethics clearance’,19 suggesting that the remaining 44 per
cent had some empirical aspect.
On a broad approach, case studies, case analysis and arguments for law reform are all
empirical methods, as they refer to ‘the real world’.20 These methods may, however, be
limited in terms of the empirical insights they can provide into the law’s operations. Moreover, Bradney notes that ‘most definitions of empirical legal research are much more
restricted’.21
The starting point for a discussion of legal empiricism is often the United States’ Legal
Realism of the early part of the twentieth century.22 Dow has described this movement as a
challenge to the dominance of ‘legal science’ and reliance on the case study method in the
late nineteenth century.23 Perhaps the most obvious goal of empirical research in law is to
contrast the ‘law in books’ with the ‘law in action’24 in the legal realist tradition.25 Kruse
has explained the necessity for this type of project as follows:
Missing from the law in books are the myriad ways the meaning of law shifts as it filters down
from appellate opinions to lower court cases; as it spreads from lower court cases to local
practices; as local practices influence the information and advice about the law transmitted
by lawyers, court clerks, social workers, probation officers, friends, neighbors, employers,
and others; and as it ultimately shapes the lives of people who receive information or advice
from these multiple sources of legal authority.26

This variance between legal doctrine and its enactment in everyday life led to early empirical studies such as Moore and Callahan’s 1940s examination of parking fines27 and Kalven
and Zeisel’s study of jury decision-making in the 1960s.28 Hutchinson explains that
‘[s]ocial science research is looking at the context in which the law operates with an
aim to providing reasonably reliable data regarding human behaviour’.29 ‘Testing’ the
effect of law in an empirical fashion allows its impact to be measured against its purpose,
thus, studies may be motivated by the desire to understand how the law actually functions.30 Kalven and Zeisel’s study involved sending questionnaires to judges, asking
them to describe ‘how the jury decided the case, and how they would have decided it
… without a jury’.31 From these data, the authors were able to examine how frequently
disagreements occurred, and the basis of these disagreements.32 They described their

19

Hutchinson and Duncan (2012), pp 99–100, referring to an audit of theses then available digitally, undertaken by Felicity
Deane and Terry Hutchinson.
George (2006), p 146. See also Epstein and King (2002) and Hutchinson and Duncan (2012), p 114. Cf. Nard’s assertion that
the ‘vast majority’ of legal research is theoretical in nature: Nard (1995), pp 348–349.
21
Bradney (2010), p 1026.
22
For example, Leeuw (2015), p 20. Though note Sarat and Silbey’s (1988) discussion of differing ‘strands’ of legal realism: at
pp 104–105; see also Trubek and Esser (1989), pp 8–10.
23
Dow (2011), pp 526–534. See also Vick (2004), pp 182–183.
24
For example, Pound (1910).
25
See, eg, Ginsburg and Shaffer (2012).
26
Kruse (2011–2012), p 660.
27
Moore and Callahan (1943).
28
Kalven and Zeisel (1971), p 11. See generally Kritzer (2009a).
29
Hutchinson (2010), p 97.
30
See, eg, Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979), p 987.
31
Kalven and Zeisel (1971), p 45.
32
See further Gastwirth and Sinclair (2004).
20
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research as one of a number of ‘contribution[s] to … realist jurisprudence’, noting other
contemporary empirical studies.33
The law and economics movement is also often described as an early foray into
empiricism in law;34 Cane and Kritzer identify studies of ‘judicial behavior/politics’
and ‘socio-legal/law and society’ as additional strands.35 In the 2000s references started
to be made to ‘empirical legal studies’ or ELS, and there is now a Journal of Empirical
Legal Studies and annual conferences around the world.36 Heise described ‘traditional’
ELS as that which ‘uses statistical techniques and analyses … studies that employ data
… to describe or support inferences to a larger sample or population’.37 The amount
of ELS work produced has grown immensely in recent years, supporting claims that it
is variously ‘booming’, ‘blossoming’ and ‘a revolution’.38 However, the focus of ELS
on quantitative research and replicability has led to it being cast as narrower than its
antecedents.39
Perhaps the strongest continuing influence, however, comes from the law and society
movement responsible for a great deal of socio-legal empirical scholarship since the
1960s.40 In 1983, Harris wrote:
There is no agreed definition of socio-legal studies: some use the term broadly to cover the
study of law in its social context, but I prefer to use it to refer to the study of the law and legal
institutions from the perspectives of the social sciences.41

Collier has observed that the term is ‘notoriously ill-defined and contested’.42 Citing Feeley, Economides refers to three branches of socio-legal studies, ‘policy science … social
science, and a distinctive socio-legal voice … ’.43 Hunter describes a continuum of
approaches,44 contrasting empiricism in pursuit of the ‘neo-liberal project of efficiency’
with more critical and theoretical socio-legal perspectives.45 The former refers to the
idea that empiricism in law can be too ‘instrumental’ or focused on a cost–benefit analysis
– putting social science to work for ‘narrow utilitarian’ ends.46

33

Kalven and Zeisel (1971), p 11 n 10, citing Conard et al (1964); La Fave (1965); Rosenberg (1964).
Economides (2014), p 269; Cooter (2011). See also Posner (1987), pp 764–765; and the Journal of Law and Economics,
published by the University of Chicago Press.
35
Cane and Kritzer (2010), p 1.
36
See http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/SELS/conferences.cfm; Chambliss (2008); Eisenberg (2011), pp 1713–1714; Ho and
Kramer (2013). The first European conference on ELS was held in June 2016.
37
Heise (2011), p 1740 n 2. Note that Cane and Kritzer (2010) eschewed use of the term in the Oxford Handbook of Empirical
Legal Research: p 1.
38
Ho and Kramer (2013), pp 1195–1196; Leeuw (2015), p 21, citing Seidman Diamond and Mueller (2010); van Dijck (2011);
Heise (2011); Eisenberg (2011).
39
See Lawless (2015) on the strengths of ELS.
40
See, eg, the Law & Society Review, the journal of the Law and Society Association (Sarat and Silbey (1988), p 112); and the
Journal of Law and Society (formerly the British Journal of Law and Society, which Harris (1983) described as ‘devoted to
socio-legal work’: p 316). Cane and Kritzer (2010) group ‘socio-legal studies’ and ‘law and society’ together; see also Adler
and Simon (2014), p 175 (Figure 1).
41
Harris (1983), p 315.
42
Collier (2004), p 518 n 69, citing Bradney (2003). Trubek and Esser (1989) likewise described the law and society movement as ‘a shaky coalition’: at p 47.
43
Economides (2014), citing Feeley (2001).
44
Hunter (2008a), p 122.
45
Hunter (2008a), pp 122–125, criticizing in particular the ‘new legal realist’ movement. See also Harrington and Merry
(2010), p 1047; Goldsmith and Vermeule (2002) (critiquing Epstein and King, 2002).
46
Feeley (2007), p 758, citing Tamanaha (2006). See also Davies (2002).
34
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3. Methods
The actual methods chosen may include quantitative or qualitative analysis of interview
material, observation or survey responses. Eisenberg, like Heise, has suggested that
Empirical Legal Studies projects ‘usually’ involve statistical analysis.47 In legal research,
methods might include what Harrington and Merry refer to as ‘archival’48 such as analysis
of court files or court records,49 as well as surveys,50 interviews51 and observation, including of lawyers interacting with their clients;52 a typical day in a lawyer’s practice53 or courtroom proceedings.54 A great deal of legal practice involves performativity: though court
work may be only a small part of a lawyer’s practice, its symbolic impact is tremendous.
Often, research will use a combination of methods in a mixed- or multi-method approach:
this can, as Harrington and Merry note, ‘enrich the insights’ of a project.55 There are many
mixed method studies involving the law.56 Feeley’s study, for example, involved observation of the courtroom, combined with quantitative analysis of court cases; McCann’s
study of labour activism utilised ethnographic observation, interviews, quantitative analysis of media reporting, as well as more traditional analysis of case law. Eekelaar, Maclean
and Beinart observed and interviewed family lawyers, as well as analysing Law Society and
Legal Aid statistics in order to draw their sample.57
At the other end of the scale, methods in which the researcher is more implicated in
interactions with participants,58 such as ‘naturalistic observation’59 in the tradition of ethnography, have also been used in legal projects. Ethnography may refer both to ‘fieldwork
and to writing, to a practice and a genre’:60 Darian-Smith describes it as ‘an in-depth study
of one culture involving ‘firsthand, detailed, description of a living culture based on personal observation’.61 Legal or criminological ethnographies may involve a detailed study of
law on the ground, in its everyday or commonplace iterations. Valverde’s Everyday Law on
the Street is an example of this – a study of the everyday enactment of planning law in
Toronto.62 Such experiences may take place over lengthy periods: Bourgois’ study of
the crack cocaine market, for example, was based on years of observation and interviews
with his neighbours in East Harlem.63
Learning about empirical research involves understanding what methodologies exist –
the idea of choosing a method implies an understanding of other potential methods, their
strengths and drawbacks. It is necessary to think carefully about whether the research
47

Eisenberg (2011), p 1719; see also Boyd (2015).
Harrington and Merry (2010), p 1052.
49
Wangmann (2009), pp 83–84.
50
Fernando (2011).
51
Mather, McEwen and Maiman (2001), pp 196–197; Eekelaar, Maclean and Beinart (2000), pp 205–207; Parkinson and
Cashmore (2008), pp 30–33; Parkinson, Webster and Cashmore (2010).
52
Cain (1979); Davis (1988); Sherr (1986); Sarat and Felstiner (1986); Sarat and Felstiner (1995).
53
Eekelaar, Maclean and Beinart (2000), pp 201–5.
54
Hunter (2008a); Wangmann (2012), pp 702–3.
55
Harrington and Merry (2010), p 1051. Though note Darbyshire, MacDougall and Schiller (2005), pp 423–44.
56
Harrington and Merry (2010), p 1052, citing McCann (1994), Ewick and Silbey (1998), Macaulay (1963); Feeley (1979).
57
Eekelaar, Maclean and Beinart (2000) ‘Appendix’.
58
See, eg, Hirsch (1998).
59
Adler and Adler (1998), p 79.
60
Herzfeld (2001), p 25, cited by Darian-Smith (2004), p 549.
61
Darian-Smith (2004), pp 548–549, citing Miller (2002), p 5. Note the suggestion that there are different ‘models’ of ethnography: Manning (2009), cited by Chan (2013), p 507; see also Travers, Putt and Howard-Wagner (2013).
62
Valverde (2012).
63
Bourgois (2003).
48
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questions posed are answerable by the method chosen. Kritzer has noted that ‘[i]t is very
easy to ask questions or collect some data, but frequently we fail to explicitly ask ourselves
what we might find in the responses or in the data that will help us answer our own question’.64 Perhaps even more importantly, it is necessary to consider the limits and assumptions implied by the very questions framed. Trubek and Esser argued, in advocating a
‘critical’ approach:
[I]n the context of this epistemology, ‘empiricism’ does not mean the accurate description of
the external world through careful observation. Rather, it means the imperative to construct
new perspectives through (a) the study (if not observation and description) of meaningful
activity in (b) locales that are defined as unorthodox and trivial from the point of view of
the dominant perspective.65

In other words, there must be awareness of the partiality and subjectivity of ‘scientific’
methods, even if the goal of empiricism remains rigor and ‘reality’.
Whatever the proposed method, undertaking an empirical legal research project (particularly as part of a higher research degree) is not a choice made lightly. Empirical
research can be expensive, frustrating, time-consuming and demanding. Whitehouse
and Bright identify four key challenges for the empirical legal researcher: lack of training,
funding constraints, accessing data and respondents, and ethics.66 Atop of these practical
constraints come more pervasive and unavoidable theoretical challenges – related to
interpretation, generalisation, subjectivity and situatedness. Differing conceptions of
what is meant by empiricism and ‘validity’ of results, and a multitude of disciplinary
and analytical frameworks, contribute to the arduousness of any project. Moore and
Maher, discussing ethnography in drug research, have suggested that it is not possible
to cleanly separate a method from a theoretical origin:
[F]or the nature of one’s relationship to research subjects, one’s intersubjective engagement,
fundamentally determines what is possible analytically, through the production of certain
kinds of data.67

Thus, the disciplinary context or origins of the method chosen remain important.
Research without such a context lays itself open to the criticism described above, the
assumption that it is possible for a ‘pure’ form of data to be collected. This is essentially
the criticism that Hunter (2014) makes of Darbyshire’s study of judges, when suggesting
the raw data had been only partially ‘digested’:68
Often, what is presented is only semi-digested: strings of quotations, minimally edited observation notes and collections of anecdotes grouped under broad headings. [Darbyshire]
explains at the outset that ‘I have not used any theoretical model’, but one rather wishes
she had.69

Rather than the absence of a theoretical model permitting greater objectivity and distance,
it in fact dampens the rigor of the work, due to the researcher’s inability to identify and
reflect upon her own position and influence in the research process. Without the
64

Kritzer (2009b), p 270 (emphasis in original).
Trubek and Esser (1989), p 43.
Whitehouse and Bright (2014), pp 183–185.
67
Moore and Maher (2002), p 246.
68
Hunter (2014), citing Darbyshire (2011).
69
Hunter (2014), p 91.
65
66
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researcher’s own analysis, the imposition of a critical position, the work seems no more
than journalistic: the consumer is left to draw his or her own conclusions. Janet Chan
has discussed the tension, particularly in criminological research, between rejecting an
overly ‘scientistic’ approach to evaluating or quantifying ‘rigor’ in qualitative research,
and acknowledging the need for validity.70 This need is heightened when a study has
clear policy ends. Lempert has cautioned against ‘overselling’ the findings of research
studies in a policy arena.71
The complexity of research design and implementation perhaps go toward explaining
why, despite a long history and many current examples of empiricism in law, empirical
legal research seems to still be seen as uncommon in Australia. The following section
turns to consider one possible reason for this: the absence of training in empiricism or
empirical methods at law schools.

4. Training in empirical methods for legal scholars
In Britain, the Nuffield Foundation commissioned a review of empirical research in law,
titled Law in the Real World and published in 2006.72 The review was prompted by fears
about the country’s future ability to conduct this type of research.73 As one author of
the report later explained, there was concern that ‘the numbers of researchers able and willing to do empirical research in law are not growing sufficiently to meet … demand’.74 In the
same year, George noted that, in contradistinction to humanities departments, law schools
in the United States ‘generally do not teach courses in survey methodology, statistical analysis, or research design’.75 As discussed below, the greater the emphasis on interdisciplinary
research, the more apparent this deficiency in empirical methods is likely to become.
Importantly, Law in the Real World found that poor capability in conducting skilled
socio-legal empirical research begins at law school where the imperatives of professional
practice constrain both curriculum and the qualities considered desirable in law teachers.76 Hillyard explained that this can create a self-fulfilling prophecy:77
[T]here is little or no room for research training courses similar to those in other social
sciences and rarely are law undergraduates required to complete a dissertation. Even if
they do one, it is unlikely to involve empirical research. There is, therefore, an absence of
scholars who are competent to supervise empirical work … 78

In other words, if undergraduate students are not exposed to empirical research in law, this
has a flow on effect to HDR students, and ultimately legal academics. Vick commented in
2004 that ‘most present-day legal academics received their undergraduate education in law
departments concerned primarily with training their students to be solicitors, barristers,
advocates, and judges, not academic lawyers’.79
70

Chan (2013), p 503.
Lempert (2008).
Genn, Partington and Wheeler (2006).
73
Witherspoon (2002), cited by Vick (2004), p 189.
74
Partington (2008), p 1.
75
George (2006).
76
Genn, Partington and Wheeler (2006), p 29.
77
Hillyard (2007), p 269.
78
Hillyard (2007), p 270. See also Hunter (2012), pp 1–16.
79
Vick (2004), p 188.
71
72
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Hillyard suggested that undergraduate law students emerge with a corresponding tendency toward ‘theoretical and textual analysis’,80 or what Burns and Hutchinson describe
as the ‘established traditional territory’ of doctrinal research.81 Loughnan and Shackel
made a similar point about Australian law HDR students, who may not even consider
empirical methods:
[F]or some law students, methodology may appear to be uncontroversial or even non-negotiable, as a student may automatically turn to case law, legislation, legal codes, treaties and
government materials such as parliamentary papers, and then subsequently to secondary
sources such as academic commentary.82

The lack of opportunity for undergraduate students to engage in empirical legal research
is, Hillyard suggests, also an effect of the neo-liberal university and the job market to which
law students are often seeking entry.83 That is, the sights of many undergraduate students
are firmly focused on attaining gainful employment as legal practitioners.84 In Australia,
the curriculum’s consequent focus on technical legal skills and doctrine, at the expense of
critical, interdisciplinary and socio-legal analyses has previously been noted.85 Burns and
Hutchinson noted that few undergraduate law courses included any training in empirical
methods.86 Yet, given the large number of law graduates who will not actually enter legal
practice, and may well end up in fields where training in empirical methods is valued, such
a focus may be misplaced.87 Of course, students may already have a background in
research methods gained from earlier degrees or work. The increasing availability of postgraduate law degrees – predominantly the Juris Doctor – in Australia,88 may also herald a
positive change, as greater numbers of law students have other degrees and training to
draw upon. Nevertheless, despite having already completed another degree, not all students would have extensive experience in empirical methods or conducting a research
project.
While a lack of exposure to empirical methods in the undergraduate curriculum may be
explicable, the absence of training for higher degree research students is perhaps more surprising. It has been suggested that this lack of training is the primary barrier to HDR students embarking on an empirical research project:89 this has been observed, for example,
of the USA90 and New Zealand,91 as well as Australia.92 Noting the prevalence of double
degrees (combined law and other disciplines), Economides argued that with a relatively

80

Hillyard (2007), p 269.
Burns and Hutchinson (2009), p 158.
Loughnan and Shackel (2009), p 107.
83
Hillyard (2007), p 270.
84
Though noting that many do not end up in legal practice: see, eg, ‘Graduates Shun Legal Profession’, The Age (Melbourne), 20 May 2012; Graduate Careers Australia, GradStats (December 2014), p 6.
85
Thornton (2007).
86
Burns and Hutchinson (2009), pp 170–171.
87
Further, understanding of social science methods is also relevant to the practice of law: see Burns and Hutchinson (2009).
88
See Loughnan and Shackel (2009), pp 99–101; Legal Profession Admission Board of NSW list of accredited law courses,
http://www.lpab.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/lpab/Accredite-Law-Courses.aspx.
89
See Harrington and Merry (2010), p 1047.
90
Dow (2011), p 526. Kelly and Kaczynski note that many American graduate students have had limited exposure to doing
qualitative research: (2007), pp 31–32, citing Eakin and Mykhalovskiy (2005); Kerlin (2000); Sells, Smith and Newfield
(1997).
91
Economides (2014), pp 261–266.
92
Carney (1993); Genn, Partington and Wheeler (2006), pp 26–27; Hutchinson (2013), pp 60–62.
81
82
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small injection of resources, socio-legal research could be better supported in the
curriculum:
[W]ith relatively modest investment in interdisciplinary modules to act as ‘bridges’ spanning
disciplinary divides, not only could the full potential of the double degree be realized but,
more importantly, stronger foundations could be laid for the research skills and working collaborations needed for socio-legal projects in higher degrees and beyond.93

Similarly, providing students with exposure to empirical methods in the undergraduate
law curriculum could provide a ‘foundation’ through encouraging some students to consider empirical work as part of postgraduate study, and at the very least, exposing students
to the idea of empirical research in law and providing some understanding of methodology. However, a historical dearth of opportunities has perhaps naturally impacted, in
turn, on the number of legal academics able to undertake (and supervise) these type of
projects.
In 1993, Carney noted the absence of ‘systematic training in research methods or theory’94 in Australian postgraduate research programs in law, while in 2004, Hutchinson
found that only two universities offered training in empirical methodologies for law
HDR students.95 Burns and Hutchinson subsequently commented on the importance of
such training for research students:
Research training must include a broader non-doctrinal methodology component … There is
a need to introduce students to the existence and nature of interdisciplinary research – the
extensive work of anthropologists, sociologists, criminologists, economists and sociologists
that impinge on the law.96

The University of Sydney Law School currently offers a program of compulsory research
seminars for its HDR students, though only one session covers methodologies.97 It seems
that few other Australian law schools offer an equivalent,98 though Griffith Law School
would appear to be a notable exception, offering various courses. Generic methods courses
may be offered centrally, outside of faculties or schools, but of course by their nature these
are not specific to law. The discipline of criminology is more likely to offer such courses to
undergraduates and coursework masters students: for example, the University of Sydney
course includes a subject titled Crime Research and Policy, in which students design a
hypothetical empirical research project. Within the discipline of law, HDR students
may thus have to pursue their own training and education via conferences, workshops
and formal training sessions, which may be external to the faculty. Funding such training
can be costly, particularly courses in using computer software or advanced statistics. This
may come on top of costs incurred in actually conducting research, such as travel and
accommodation, transcription or data entry. University ethics committees have obligations to consider the safety of researchers as well as research subjects, but precautions

93

Economides (2014), p 277.
Carney (1993), p 165.
95
Hutchinson (2004), p 80.
96
Burns and Hutchinson (2009), p 168; see also Hutchinson (2013).
97
See Manderson (2002), p 155; Loughnan and Shackel (2009).
98
Noting, however, that this is based on the information available on university websites, which may not include all available options such as ‘auditing’ subjects from other courses or degrees.
94
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may impose an additional financial burden.99 Even where available, Zeiler has sounded a
note of caution about short training courses, suggesting these ‘are problematic in that they
attempt to teach material generally covered over at least three semesterlong courses’ in
unrealistically short timeframes.100
4.1. Empirical work by legal academics
In addition to difficulties in obtaining formal training in empirical methods, a lack of
exposure to academics using such methods and opportunities to be appropriately supervised in empirical work must also be significant for HDR students. Concerns about a lack
of training in empirical methods for North American legal academics were voiced in the
1990s.101 As George noted in 2006, this heightened the importance of collaborating with
scholars who have such training and experience. Observing that collaborations did appear
to be increasing (though legal academics were less likely that their social science equivalents to publish with co-authors), she explained:
Non-social scientists benefit from the presence of social scientists for informal interactions,
such as advice on how to undertake an empirical project or what method would be appropriate, and for formal collaborations, such as co-authorship.102

More recently, however, Heise has identified that ‘an ever-increasing number of [US] law
professors possess either formal training in an array of social science fields (including, but
not limited to, economics) or a substantial appreciation for social scientific methodologies’.103 He connects this to the continuing growth of empirical legal scholarship.104
Hersch and Viscusi reported that a significant proportion (one-fifth) of academics at
the 26 highest ranked law schools had a doctorate in a social science field.105 LoPucki
found that ‘62% of PhD holders on top-twenty-six law school faculties have their PhDs
in fields where Statistics is likely required’,106 with a greater proportion of PhDs in economics and political science, than history or philosophy. Law professors with PhDs in law
comprised only 3 per cent.107 LoPucki has argued that though American law schools
employ faculty members with PhDs in order to promote empirical research, it is not an
effective means of doing so.108 It is not clear that the hiring practices of Australian law
schools are following a similar trend, though there seems to be greater emphasis placed
on attaining a PhD than previously.
Despite the apparently greater emphasis being given to interdisciplinarity, a more pessimistic view identifies ‘significant impediments’ to collaboration, including lack of understanding of other disciplines, poor collaborative skills and the individualistic and
competitive atmosphere of law schools.109 There may also be structural and institutional
99
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barriers: Baron suggested that law faculties traditionally encouraged ‘lone wolf researchers’.110 Burns and Hutchinson quote Adler who, describing the UK, commented on ‘the
weak position of socio-legal researchers’ and lack of incentives to ‘encourage law schools
to take postgraduate training in socio-legal studies seriously’.111 They suggest that the Australian topography is much the same.112 Nevertheless, it is claimed that there is a ‘shift’
away from the doctrinal, toward the use of empirically based methodologies113 with the
importance of interdisciplinary collaboration emphasised particularly through the allocation of funding.114
Such collaboration still takes time and energy, as relationships must be developed and
negotiated. Moreover, postgraduate students and even early career researchers may not
have sufficient academic connections or experience to readily find advice and guidance
from others. Thus, when it comes to rigorous training in empirical methodologies,
there likely remains a dependence on supervisors, as Carney and later Burns and Hutchinson identified,115 or fortuitous encounters with more senior scholars.116
The importance of supervision is further emphasised by a school of thought suggesting
that empirical research, particularly the use of qualitative techniques such as interviewing
and ethnographic methods, can only be learned by doing.117 The experience of undertaking an empirical project has been called a ‘rite of passage’ which must be undertaken by the
researcher, as it is learned ‘[o]nly through the fieldwork experience’.118 This has implications for supervision and the degree to which an HDR student is restricted to utilising
those methods or theoretical perspectives with which his or her supervisor is familiar.

5. Why use empirical methods?
This section considers why legal academics or HDR students might wish to venture into
using empirical methods. These reasons can perhaps be described generally as falling into
two types of category or rationale: the practical or policy-oriented; and the theoretical or
critical. Nevertheless, both are valid and indeed necessary aspects of empirical legal
research.
Hutchinson has explained that ‘[l]awyers tend not to use empirical methods and results
because they are untrained in the discipline, but in order to put time into learning methodology, lawyers need to be able to understand the need for empirical knowledge’.119 Often
it is tempting to refer to this need or value in pragmatic terms – focusing on the instrumental,120 such as how it can make one a ‘better lawyer’ or more employable. Of course,
familiarity with empirical methods can have practical benefits for lawyers. On the links
between social research methodology and law, Kalven and Zeisel commented:
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Social science more than natural science is forced to operate at a remove from the reality it
studies. It must work, therefore, through a chain of inferences. In a formulation which should
carry familiar overtones for the lawyer, social science works with quantified circumstantial
evidence.121

In other words, they suggest congruence in the logical reasoning processes underpinning
both research method and building a case based in evidence. In addition, litigation across
many areas of law often requires the use of evidence gained from empirical data, and hence
requires lawyers to have an understanding of how such data is produced.122 Corbin and
Dow suggest that this includes
knowing when scientific data are useful in resolving legal issues, knowing what sorts of data
are useful, knowing how to interpret and evaluate such data and how to draw conclusions
from them, and, for lawyers in particular, knowing how to make effective use of scientific
data in litigation.123

Burns and Hutchinson have similarly emphasised the importance of social science
research training by reference to the importance of ‘empirical facts’ in legal proceedings
and judicial decision-making.124
Such skills are also useful in academia, including when trying to attract research funding.125 Hutchinson and Duncan note that ‘competition for limited research funds is being
more intense’, while ‘interdisciplinary work is highly valued’.126 Changes to Australian
research funding to emphasise ‘outcomes with commercial and community benefit’
may also have an impact.127 As Vick explained:
In purely pragmatic terms, interdisciplinarity offers an opportunity for product differentiation in an increasingly competitive academic market … Interdisciplinary research is perceived to be popular with research funding bodies, and for legal academics in particular it
provides access to research grants of a magnitude not usually available for ‘pure’ legal
research.128

For law HDR students, undertaking empirical research can make it easier to produce a
contribution to scholarship that meets the requirements of originality.129 Schmidt and
Halliday also suggest it may be less boring and frustrating than doctrinal work.130
The capacity to understand and evaluate ‘law in the real world’ will be beneficial in
other contexts too, such as consultancy, government, law reform and advocacy. It may
form a sound basis to recommend change to law or legal policy; authors have noted the
importance of ‘bridg[ing] the policy/research divide’ in law as in other disciplines.131
There are also examples of notorious misunderstandings and misuse of research findings
in law. For example, the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, conducted in the
1980s, is a classic study in the real-world application of research findings, with unfortunate
121
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practical consequences.132 In a subtler example, Lacey refers to Dworkin and MacKinnon’s anti-pornography ordinance133 – city ordinances declaring pornography to be a violation of women’s civil rights, later struck down on freedom of speech grounds – as
illustrating the difficulties in translating a theoretical critique into a policy response.134
Undertaking empirical projects may be a way of helping particular communities to
have their voices heard, and can provide a sense of meaningful engagement with what
matters about the law – such as its effect on people’s lives – in contradistinction to
‘ivory tower’ syndrome. On the other hand, such goals, while noble, can also increase
the time, difficulty and stress of doing empirical research. The researcher may feel a greater
obligation to or communion with research participants, for example,135 which may be
heightened if communities or individuals are seeking, or require, legal assistance.136
There is a particular power in empirical work that enables subjects to speak for themselves:
Lacey has explained that socio-legal studies
subject[s] legal practices to a (broadly speaking) empirical inquiry which scrutinizes not
merely the legal articulation of the relevant rules and processes but the meaning and effects
of those rules and processes as interpreted and enforced, and as experienced by their
subjects.137

The way that research subjects describe and assign meaning to particular events is thus the
focus of study – without any assumptions that any one perspective represents the ultimate
‘truth’ about legal proceedings or interactions. This focus, of course, undeniably implicates
the researcher in the obtaining, interpretation and construction of ‘data’. This is pertinent
for law, given the ‘translation’ role that lawyers and legal academics occupy, and the way
that lawyers are already implicated in the ascertainment of ‘facts’ in a legal context.138
Seuffert has explained that, in contrast to traditional assumptions about a lawyer’s neutral
role in eliciting information:
Knowledge is produced in all lawyer-client interactions in countless acts of interpretation:
knowledge about the client, her stories and her desires, knowledge about the lawyer and
her role and knowledge about the law and the client’s and the lawyer’s positions in relation
to the law. This knowledge production is informed by the context in which it takes place,
including the perspectives and experiences of the lawyer and client.139

Problems in communication between lawyers and clients can, as Seuffert’s study identified, have serious consequences for vulnerable clients, echoing the role of the researcher
vis-à-vis research subjects.140

132

The project found that particular responses by police when called to domestic violence incidents were more effective in
reducing recidivism, but later studies were unable to replicate these results. See Sherman and Cohn (1989); Sherman et al
(1992). Posner (1987) also provides numerous examples of ‘reforms engineered by lawyers’ that have ‘miscarried’: at pp
769–771.
133
MacKinnon (1989), ch 11; see also Sandler (1984).
134
Lacey (1996), pp 141, 146.
135
See, eg, Becker (1967); MacKenzie, Christensen and Turner (2015).
136
See, eg, Wangmann (2009), p 65.
137
Lacey (1996), p 132 (emphasis added).
138
Sherr (1999).
139
Seuffert (1996), p 527.
140
See, eg, Oakley (1981); Jack (1999); Maher (2001); Wangmann (2009); Stanton (2014).

GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW

275

5.1. Policy-oriented studies
The empirical impulse to measure the ‘gap’141 between ‘formal law’ and ‘practical reality’142 – how the law actually works – can be seen as a highly important and complex
shift away from the doctrinal. Many studies adopted such an approach.143 In response,
however, sociologists of law raised concerns about the influence of policy goals or a policy-focused orientation in empirical research. Sarat and Silbey explained that ‘critics of socalled “gap” research argue that policy studies are too complacent and too much influenced by official criteria and definitions of legal problems’.144 Lacey has also problematised the ‘technocratic instrumentalism of “policy-oriented” studies’.145 Fischman has
described the failings of ‘early legal empiricists’ as deriving from ‘their inability to develop
any kind of theoretical framework for making their empirical findings relevant to normative legal scholarship’.146 He posits that this predicament remains to some extent, though
tempered by the discipline’s increasing sophistication.
Thus, some have argued that an empirical approach in law is important for reasons
beyond the evaluative or the pursuit of ‘efficiency’.147 Indeed, Hunter’s critique of Law
in the Real World is that its authors focused too much on empirical methods as
a tool for policy makers … without reference to other ‘uses’ of and frameworks for thinking
about such research, and without any consideration of the relationship between empirical
research and critical scholarship.148

Likewise, two decades earlier, Sarat and Silbey criticised what they suggest had become a
conventional ‘form’ of law and society research: ‘begin with a policy problem, locate it in a
general theoretical context, present an empirical study to speak to that problem, and conclude with recommendations, suggestions or cautions’.149 In their discussion of key studies
of the time,150 they elucidate some of their concerns about the ‘pull of the policy audience’,
not least among them the legitimation of the policy elite and their goals. A consequence of
this is a tendency to ‘[emphasize] the centrality of the state in law and thus [diminish] the
critical potential of sociolegal scholarship’.151
The unifying strand of the critiques made by Sarat and Silbey, Lacey, and Hunter,
focuses on this faith in the possibility of unearthing objective ‘truths’ via empirical
methods. For example, in their critique of Blumberg’s (1967) work, Sarat and Silbey
wrote that:
For Blumberg the results of his inquiry involve neither an interpretation nor a social construction of reality. They are presented as if his observations provide immediate, unmediated
access to the actual operations of the criminal court … It is … in his view, the version, the true
and accurate version.152
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This goes beyond a methodological concern about mode of analysis – it is the very concept that an answer exists and is discoverable or ascertainable, with which the authors take
issue.
Likewise, Hunter takes issue with what she terms the ‘new legal realism’ (referring to
empirical legal studies) for its avoidance of political agenda; in proclaiming neutrality, it
is ‘positivist but non-normative’.153 Echoing Vick, however, she notes that this type of policy-oriented, pragmatic empiricism has been encouraged also by institutional structures,
as fiscal imperatives compel academics to seek grants and consultancies, and research outputs are measured in economic terms.154 Hutchinson and Duncan wrote:
Within the universities, there is an emphasis on increasing links with industry and funded
applied research, rather than on purely theoretical research. Governments are encouraging
institutional specialisation and centres of excellence, by funding research infrastructure
and research training.155

Though there are many practical and strategic reasons for legal researchers to undertake
empirical projects, the critical and theoretical potentiality of empiricism should not be
overlooked. To a large extent, arguments for empiricism’s theoretical possibility resonate
with claims about the value of interdisciplinarity to law.156 The critical appraisal of a
reductionist or instrumental approach to empiricism does not deny the importance of
methodological rigour but recognises what empiricism offers by way of critique, selfreflection and deep understanding of the social impact of law. In this formulation, empiricism is more than simply an extension of scientific methods to socio-legal research. Hunter calls for an aggregation of ‘critical theoretical, progressive political, policy oriented and
empirical approaches to law’.157 She provides case studies of three different research projects where the original policy goals were modified, subverted or themselves interrogated
in response to empirical findings and the critical stance of the researchers.158

6. Conclusion
There are many reasons for legal scholars to venture into empiricism. The diversity of
empirical projects in law indicates that there is no unitary or ideal approach to empiricism
and no reason to take a narrow approach to what constitutes an empirical project. Regardless of the actual methods used, whether qualitative or quantitative, or the type of analysis
undertaken, empiricism has a useful place in the law school. The failure of more legal scholars to engage in empirical projects speaks to both the predominance of doctrinal methods
(despite some indications of change) and the absence of training and supervision. However, it also calls up a more pervasive discomfort with interdisciplinarity and absorptions
of the theoretical as well as methodological lessons of other disciplines, such as sociology,
anthropology and cultural studies. Lacey and Hunter, and others, have argued for a more
‘critical’ approach to empirical work in law, wherein analysis of law’s effects includes a
153
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critical focus on its social consequences and a political (or rather, not apolitical) critique.159 To conduct an empirical legal project of any kind requires an understanding
of what the law does not know – not so that this part of the project can be hived off to
someone with relevant expertise, but so that the entire aim can be re-visioned. Approaching an empirical project with a comprehensive understanding of what has gone before –
whether the lens is socio-legal, policy-oriented or descriptive –promotes methodological
rigor, which ultimately serves both pragmatic and theoretical ends.
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